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Abstract
The tax reform literature, pioneered by Guesnerie [1977], uses static models but views
tax reform as a dynamic process, i.e., as a policy-maker implementing incremental
reforms over time. This paper studies tax reform in a dynamic version of the Diamond-
Mirrlees-Guesnerie model and focuses on a specific aspect of the dynamic process,
namely, the implications for tax reform of agents leaving bequests. The main idea is that
a tax reform in one period will affect bequests and therefore endowments, equilibrium,
and welfare in subsequent periods. Thus, the process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as
a sequence of static economies; instead, the economies are linked by bequests. The paper
undertakes a tax reform analysis a la Guesnerie, but with an added focus on welfare
improving reforms for each generation. Second-best Pareto optima are then characterized,
and these conditions are compared to the static optimal tax formulae derived in the
literature. In particular, the key Diamond-Mirrlees result that production efficiency is
desirable at second-best optima no longer holds in the presence of (effective) restrictions
on the taxation of private savings. Restrictions on government savings (including
balanced budget restrictions), however, do not disturb the desirability of production
efficiency. Finally, the effects of certain political constraints on the tax reform process
are also considered.
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1. Introduction
The relevance of optimal tax formulae, as developed by Diamond and Mirrlees
[1971] among others, has been questioned on several grounds. In particular, the
implementation of such formulae would likely require a major upheaval of the existing
tax system, which policy-makers are unwilling or unable to do. In practice, actual
changes are ‘slow and piecemeal’. This has shifted the emphasis from ‘tax design’ to ‘tax
reform’, see especially Guesnerie [1977, 1995]. The tax reform literature takes the
existing tax system as given, and examines the conditions under which there exist
(differential) changes in taxes that are equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving, i.e.,
feasible reforms that increase the welfare of every agent in the economy.
1
Despite using a static model, it is clear that Guesnerie [1977, 1995] views tax
reform as a dynamic process, i.e., as a policy-maker implementing incremental reforms
over time. The dynamic aspect is analyzed explicitly in Fogelman, Quinzii, and
Guesnerie [1978], who focus on the standard technical questions raised by dynamic
systems: existence and stability. The present paper, however, studies a specific aspect of
the dynamic process, namely, the implications for tax reform of agents leaving bequests.
The main idea is fairly straightforward: a tax reform in one period will affect bequests
and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in subsequent periods. Thus, the
process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies; instead, the
economies are dynamically linked by bequests. Accordingly, the taxation of capital plays
                                                          
1 The optimal tax literature has also been criticized for its reliance on the existence of a social welfare
function. Tax reform analysis does not require a social welfare function to be specified, although it can be
helpful in some aspects.3
an important role, and the government can transfer resources through time itself by
running (temporary) budget deficits and surpluses. These policy instruments are not
available to the government in static models, in which there are no savings and the
government’s budget must always be balanced.
The paper employs a simple three-period model which is sufficient to capture the
phenomena we are interested in, and the finite horizon prevents the government from
running a Ponzi scheme. If the government undertakes a policy reform in period 1
bequests are likely to change, and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in
subsequent periods will be disturbed. Thus, the government may be obligated to
undertake reforms in periods 2 and 3, at least to restore equilibrium and balance its
budget. Similarly, if the government does not reform in period 1 but does so in period 2,
equilibrium and welfare in period 3 will be disturbed via the bequest and/or government
bond mechanism. The model is described in greater detail in Section 2.
Section 3 undertakes a tax reform analysis a la Guesnerie [1977, 1995]. That is,
we address the central questions of tax reform analysis: (i) does there exist an equilibrium
preserving reform that makes a particular generation better-off?, and the usual question
addressed in the tax reform literature: (ii) does there exist an equilibrium preserving
reform that makes every agent (generation) better-off? This provides the basis for a
characterization of second-best Pareto optima in Section 4, i.e., conditions under which
there does not exist a feasible reform that makes every generation better-off are derived.
Section 5 examines the implications of constraints on the policy reform process
which have received a great deal of attention both in academic circles and in public4
policy debates. The first type of constraint considered is restrictions on the taxation of
capital and the government’s ability to issue debt (say because the legislature will not
approve such changes). The second type of constraint considered is a political constraint
 that the welfare of generation i must not be reduced in the process of implementing a
policy reform (say by the need of the government to get re-elected). The main finding is
that the key Diamond-Mirrlees result that production efficiency is desirable at second-
best optima no longer holds in the presence of (effective) restrictions on the taxation of
private savings. Restrictions on government savings (including period-by-period
balanced budget restrictions), however, do not disturb the desirability of production
efficiency. Regarding the political constraint, it is shown to have a surprisingly
straightforward effect on the conditions for second-best optimality. Section 6 contains
some concluding remarks, and summarizes the main results of the paper.
2. The Model
The model has three periods, with consumers living for one period. There is a
single representative consumer in each period, so the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘generation’
are used interchangeably. The dynamic structure of the model is broadly similar to the
finite horizon OLG model of Blackorby and Brett [1999, 2004], but the key feature of the
present model is that each generation cares about its own welfare as well as that of the
following generation. This altruism materializes as a bequest. There are two types of
bequest. The first is a storable capital good which forms the basis for the capital stock
and can be purchased from the firm. The second is a bond which can be purchased from
the government. From the point of view of each generation, the capital good and bond are5
perfect substitutes, as both shift-out the budget constraint of the recipient generation.
Competition between the government and firm for private savings ensures that the prices
of the capital good and government bond are the same. The details of the model are now
described.
2.1. Consumers
Generation 1 chooses its net (of endowment) consumption vector of non-storable
goods 
1 x  ∈ 
n   , its leisure time 
1 l  ∈ [0, 1], and its bequest 
1 κ  := 
1 k  + 
1 b  ∈  +    to solve
the following program:
11 1 1 (,  , ,) V   R πρω  = max
11 1 1 (,  ,   ) Uxlκ
subject to: 
11 11 1 1  +      (1    ) +  xl R πρ κ ω ≤−     (2.1)
where superscripts indicate the time period and corresponding generation, V(⋅) is the
indirect utility function, π ∈ 
n
+    is the consumer price vector corresponding to the net
consumption vector x,  ρ  ∈  +    is the consumer price of the capital good k and
government bond b (which is the mechanism for leaving bequests), ω ∈  +    is the wage
(or consumer price of leisure), where the endowment of leisure is normalized to unity so
that (1 − l
1) is labor supplied, R ∈     is a lump-sum tax, which is restricted to be the
same for each generation,
2 and U(⋅) is the direct utility function. The restriction 
1 κ  ∈  +  
ensures that generation 1 cannot die in debt. However, the purchase of government bonds
                                                          
2 R is sometimes called a poll tax or demogrant. The restriction that R be the same for each generation
makes the model second-best, as the government does not have access to personalized lump-sum transfers.6
can be positive or negative, depending upon whether the government is running a budget
deficit or surplus.
The inclusion of the bequest in generation 1’s direct utility function is simpler
(and arguably more realistic) than the usual assumption made regarding bequests in OLG
models  that each generation knows the utility functions of the following generations
and acts as if maximizing an infinite horizon utility function.
3 Program (2.1) simply says
that generation 1 divides its income between purchases of non-storable goods for itself
and a bequest for generation 2 to maximize a utility function which represents generation
1’s preferences over its own consumption and (in some sense) that of generation 2. In this
framework, bequests provide a positive externality to the recipient generation, as they
boost the recipient’s income and indirect utility (see below).
Similarly, generation 2 chooses its net consumption vector 
2 x  ∈ 
n   , its leisure
time 
2 l  ∈ [0, 1], and its bequest 
2 κ  ∈  +    to solve the following program:
22 2 2 21 (,  , , , ,  ) V   R   πρω σκ = max
22 2 2 (,  ,   ) Uxlκ
subject to: 
22 22 2 2 21  +      (1    ) +  xl R  +   πρ κ ω σ κ ≤−                 (2.2)
where σ
2 ∈  +    is the price generation 2 receives from selling the bequest it obtains from
generation 1 to the firm (see below) and government at the beginning of the second
period.
                                                          
3 See chapter 3 in Blanchard and Fischer [1989]. However, Hu [1979] for example also includes bequests in
the direct utility function.7
Generation 3 does not leave a bequest, as it is the last generation. Alternatively,
generation 3 can be thought of as a purely non-altruistic generation. It chooses its net
consumption vector 
3 x  ∈ 
n    and leisure time 
3 l  ∈ [0, 1] to solve the following program:
33 3 32 (, ,, ,  ) V   R   πω σκ  = max
33 3 (,  ) Uxl
subject to: 
33 3 3 3 2    (1   )  +  xl R  +   πω σ κ ≤−          (2.3)
Note that generation 1 can be thought of as the ‘start-up’ generation, as it does not
receive a bequest from the (non-existent) previous generation. Similarly, generation 3 is
the ‘shut-down’ generation, as it does not leave a bequest. On the other hand generation
2, which both receives and leaves bequests, is of the usual type studied in infinite horizon
models. Also note that it is implicit in the above formulation that the government taxes
away all pure profits, as the consumers have no profit income. The assumption of a 100
percent tax on profits, or constant returns to scale in production which implies zero
maximal profits, is standard in the optimal tax and tax reform literatures.
2.2. Prices and Taxes
Consumer prices are disconnected from producer prices by a complete system of











































where p ∈ 
n
+    is the producer price vector corresponding to x, r ∈  +    is the price the
firm receives from selling k, w ∈  +    is the price the firm pays for hiring labor, and s ∈
+    is the price the firm pays for purchases of k. Taxes (or subsidies) are simply the
difference between consumer prices and producer prices.
2.3. Production
The supply side of the economy consists of a single, aggregate, profit maximizing
firm whose technology changes over time, making this formulation consistent with any
assumptions regarding capital depreciation or technical progress. The firm’s profit
























































where the upper-case L and K are used to denote the firm’s demands for labor and capital,
i.e., it purchases capital from the consumers at the beginning of periods 2 and 3. The firm
does not purchase any capital in period 1, as there is no supply by consumers, nor does it
produce any capital in period 3, as there is no demand by consumers. Note that subscript
notation indicates supply or demand by the firm.
2.4. General Competitive Equilibrium
Equilibrium is obtained if and only if:9
Period 1:




(n)       (2.6)
11 1 1 (,  , ,) k   R πρω  − k1(p
1, r
1, w
1) ≤ 0          (2.7)





11 1 1 (,  , ,) l   R πρω  − 1 ≤ 0          (2.9)
Period 2:






(n)         (2.10)





2) ≤ 0         (2.11)














11 1 1 (,  , ,) k   R πρω  ≤ 0      (2.14)
B2 − 
11 1 1 (,  , ,) b   R πρω  ≤ 0   (2.15)
Period 3:














22 2 2 21 (,  , , , ,  ) k   R   πρω σκ ≤ 0         (2.18)
B3 − 
22 2 2 21 (,  , , , ,  ) b   R   πρω σκ ≤ 0      (2.19)
where b1 and b2 denote the supply of bonds by the government in periods 1 and 2, and B2
and B3 denote the government’s demand (repurchases) of bonds in periods 2 and 3. The
model’s finite horizon prevents the government from engaging in some sort of Ponzi10
game, with Walras’ Law ensuring that the government’s budget is balanced over the three
periods. Note that the periods are linked by the demand for and supply of capital and
government bonds. Thus, reforms in periods 1 and 2 will disturb equilibrium in periods 2
and 3, i.e., we do not have just a sequence of static economies. For analytical purposes, it
is assumed that the status quo is a ‘tight’ equilibrium, i.e., equations (2.6) − (2.19) all
hold with equality.
3. Characterizing Reform Possibilities
Apart from the fixed 100 percent tax on pure profits, the government’s policy
instruments are the taxes on commodities, bequests, and labor, as well as the bonds and
demogrant. As the government does not supply nor demand commodities, it uses its
instruments only to redistribute income (or to pick equilibria in the sense of the Second
Theorem of Welfare Economics), not to finance public goods and services.








1 d x t , dr
1, 
1 d k t , dw
1, 
1 d l t , db1〉




2 d x t , dr
2, 
2 d k t , dw
2, 






3 d x t , dw
3, 
3 d l t , ds
3, dτ
3, dB3〉
correspond to changes in the government’s second- and third-period instruments.
A reform dP satisfies the equilibrium conditions (2.6) − (2.19) if and only if
∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11), where ∇Z is a Jacobian matrix of excess-demand derivatives and is11
defined explicitly in the Appendix. The welfare of generation 1 increases if and only if
dV
1(⋅) = ∇V
1dP > 0, where ∇V
1 is the gradient of generation 1’s indirect utility function
(see the Appendix for details). Analogously, the welfares of generations 2 and 3 increase
if and only if dV
2(⋅) = ∇V
2dP > 0 and dV
3(⋅) = ∇V
3dP > 0.
The above formulation gives the government 6n + 19 instruments, but it must
satisfy the 3n + 11 equilibrium conditions in (2.6) − (2.19) which, by the Implicit
Function Theorem, suggests 3n + 8 degrees of freedom in picking equilibria. However,
six of these degrees of freedom are only apparent since a consumer price and a producer
price can be normalized to one in each period.
4 This still leaves the government with 3n +
2 degrees of freedom in picking equilibria. We are interested in how these equilibria
compare to the status quo on the basis of certain normative criteria, which is the issue
now addressed.
3.1. Equilibrium Preserving and Welfare Improving Reforms
In this subsection, equilibrium preserving and welfare improving reforms are
characterized a la Guesnerie [1977: Proposition 4], Guesnerie [1995: Theorem 1, p.145],
Brett [1998: Proposition 2], and more recently Murty and Russell [2003: Theorem 1].
Specifically, we want to know if there exists a feasible reform that makes a particular
generation better-off, and if there exists a feasible reform that makes every generation
(agent) better-off (which is the usual question addressed in the tax reform literature). The
answer is given by Proposition 1 and its corollaries.
                                                          
4 This follows from the consumers’ demand functions being homogenous of degree zero in consumer prices
and the demogrant, and the producer’s output-supply and input-demand functions being homogenous of
degree zero in producer prices12
Proposition 1:
Let Γ ⊆ 
6+ 1 9 n    be the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations
of the rows of ∇Z. If ∇V
i ∈ Γ, then there does not exist an equilibrium preserving policy
reform process  that makes generation i better-off.  If  ∇V
i  ∉  Γ,  then there exists an
equilibrium preserving policy reform process that makes generation i better-off.
Proof:
By Farkas’ Theorem (see Appendix), there exists a µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z =
∇V
i, or there exists a dP such that ∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) and ∇V
idP > 0. Next, note that ∇V
i ∈ Γ
implies that there must exist a µ  ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z = ∇V
i, which by Farkas’
Theorem implies no solution dP to ∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) and ∇V
idP > 0. That is, there does not
exist an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that makes generation i better-off.
Conversely, ∇V
i ∉ Γ implies that there cannot exist a µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z = ∇V
i,
which means there exists a reform dP such that ∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) and ∇V
idP > 0. Ç
Following the existing tax reform literature, we are particularly interested in the
possibility of equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reforms. In the present




1 ∈ Γ or ∇V
2 ∈ Γ or ∇V
3 ∈ Γ, then there does not exist an equilibrium
preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process. That is, the economy is at a
local second-best optimum.13
Corollary 1.2:
Suppose Γ ∩ −Γ = {0
(6n+19)}, i.e., Γ is a pointed cone. Let −P(Γ) be the negative
polar cone of Γ. If −P(Γ) ⊆ −Γ and ∇V
1 ∈ −Γ and ∇V
2 ∈ −Γ and ∇V
3 ∈ −Γ, then there
exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process. That is, the
economy is not at a local second-best optimum.
Corollary 1.3:
Suppose Γ ∩ −Γ = {0
(6n+19)}, i.e., Γ is a pointed cone. Let −P(Γ) be the negative
polar cone of Γ. If −Γ ⊆ −P(Γ) and ∇V
1 ∈ −P(Γ) and ∇V
2 ∈ −P(Γ) and ∇V
3 ∈ −P(Γ),
then there exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process.
That is, the economy is not at a local second-best optimum.
Corollary 1.4:
If ∇V
1 ∉ Γ and ∇V
2 ∉ Γ and ∇V
3 ∉ Γ, and at least one of these vectors is an
element of the complement of Γ ∪ −P(Γ) ∪ −Γ (relative to 
6+ 1 9 n   ), then there may or
may not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process.
Some intuition for Proposition 1 and its corollaries can be obtained by reference
to Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates an example (in a stylized two-
dimensional manner) in which there exists an equilibrium preserving reform that makes
generation 1 better-off, but generations 2 and 3 are made worse-off. A reform dP is
equilibrium preserving if it forms an obtuse angle with all the rows of ∇Z. Letting Γ
denote the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations of the rows of ∇Z,
the set of equilibrium preserving reforms is therefore −P(Γ), i.e., the negative polar cone
of Γ. A reform dP makes generation i better-off if dP forms a strictly acute angle with the14
gradient of generation i’s indirect utility function ∇V
i. In the top panel of Figure 1, the
shaded area is the set of equilibrium preserving reforms which make generation 1 better-
off. However, all equilibrium preserving reforms make generations 2 and 3 worse-off, as
they all form obtuse angles with ∇V
2 and ∇V
3.
Further insight into Proposition 1 can be obtained by considering the hypothetical
problem of choosing the policy instruments P to maximize the welfare of some
generation i subject to the equilibrium preserving constraints (2.6) − (2.19). Suppose P  
solves this problem, then by the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem there exists a µ    ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such
that:
Z µ∇    = ∇V
i     (KT)
where  µ    is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. If ∇V
i ∉ Γ, then there cannot exist a
vector µ    ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that (KT) is satisfied. That is, the status quo equilibrium does not
‘look like’ the policy instruments have already been chosen to maximize the welfare of
generation i. In this case, there must exist a feasible reform which makes generation i
better-off. On the other hand, if there does not exist a feasible reform which makes
generation i better-off, then (KT) is satisfied and the status quo equilibrium ‘looks like’
the policy instruments have already been chosen to maximize the welfare of generation i.




3 must be ‘close enough’ in the sense made precise by
Corollaries 1.1 − 1.4. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates an example (again in a
stylized two-dimensional manner) in which there exists an equilibrium preserving and15
Pareto improving reform. In this example ∇V
1, ∇V
2, and ∇V
3 are all elements of −Γ,
which is a sufficient condition for there to exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto
improving reform (refer Corollary 1.2).
While Proposition 1 might be criticized for being too abstract, this is unavoidable.
The question of tax reform is a difficult one, and it does not lend itself to a simple answer
with a straightforward economic interpretation. However, the usefulness of Proposition 1
is that it forms the basis for the characterization of second-best Pareto optima (see
below), and it provides an empirically implementable methodology for identifying the
possibility of welfare improving reforms. That is, the criteria of Proposition 1 can be
checked empirically by constructing the cone Γ and with knowledge of the gradients of
the consumers’ indirect utility functions. The construction of Γ requires estimates of
various aggregate demand and supply derivatives. The gradients of the consumers’
indirect utility functions are not directly observable. However, by Roy’s Theorem, ∇V
i is
proportional to consumer i’s consumption vector, and survey data are available which
provide details on household consumption (e.g., the household survey used to construct
the CPI). In sum, the information requirements of Proposition 1 (and its corollaries) can
be met. Examples of empirical applications of tax reform theory, following the work of
Guesnerie [1977], are King [1983] and Ahmad and Stern [1984].
4. Second-Best Pareto Optima
As noted by Guesnerie [1977] and Weymark [1979], necessary conditions for the
non-existence of an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform are, in fact,
necessary conditions for the initial position to be Pareto optimal. In other words, these16
conditions characterize second-best optima as in the optimal tax literature, and are
derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 2:









That is, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy
reform process, then the economy is at a local second-best optimum and there exist two
vectors of multipliers λ > 0
(3) and µ ≥ 0
(3n+11) such that:
λ∇V = µ∇Z     (4.1)
Proof:
Follows from Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative (see Appendix). Ç
The existence of the multipliers guaranteed by Proposition 2 is not very
informative in itself. However, each multiplier λi can be interpreted as the implied
welfare weight of generation i, and the multipliers µ are the social shadow prices of the
3n + 11 commodities. That is, if the government could choose its policy instruments to
maximize a social welfare function W(
1 V , 
2 V , 
3 V ) subject to (2.6) − (2.19), then λi =
()/
i WV ∂⋅ ∂ and µ is the vector of multipliers attached to the 3n + 11 constraints in (2.6) −
(2.19). In other words, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto
improving policy reform process, the economy ‘looks like’ the government has already17














which is known in the optimal tax literature as the social marginal utility of income of
generation i ( ()/
ii VI ∂∂ ◊  is generation i’s private marginal utility of income).
Expanding (4.1) yields the first-order (necessary) conditions for second-best
optimality. The system (4.1) contains 25 equations which correspond to the government’s
6n + 19 policy instruments. Each equation in (4.1) has a standard interpretation in the
optimal tax literature: at an optimum, the marginal social benefit of a change in any
instrument is equal to the marginal social cost of that change.
5 For example, a tax
decrease which reduces the consumer price of some good will boost consumption of that
good and welfare. This is the benefit. The cost is that the increase in demand must be met
by an increase in supply by transferring resources from other sectors of the economy.
Some characteristics of the second-best Pareto optima  in particular, how they compare
to the optima of the static Diamond-Mirrlees-Guesnerie model  are discussed in the
following corollaries. Proofs, where necessary, are relegated to the Appendix.
Corollary 2.1:
At all second-best  Pareto optima production efficiency holds. That is, social
shadow prices are proportional to producer prices in each period.
                                                          
5 See, for example, Diamond and Mirrlees [1971: Equations 19 and 66], Dixit [1979: Equations 11 and 12],
Guesnerie [1995: Theorem 8, p.178], and Blackorby and Brett [2000: p.305].18
The term ‘production efficiency’ has been used in various guises in the optimal
tax and tax reform literatures. Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] say production is efficient if
technical rates of substitution in private and public sector production are equal. This is
the usual definition of production efficiency. In Guesnerie [1977, 1995: Chapter 3] an
equilibrium is temporarily (production) inefficient if it involves excess supply of some
goods, i.e., ‘non-tight’ equilibria. Blackorby and Brett [2000], see also Guesnerie [1995:
Chapter 4], define an equilibrium to be production efficient if producer prices are
proportional to social shadow prices. This is equivalent to the Diamond-Mirrlees
definition if there is a public producer, because social shadow prices are the relevant
prices for public production decisions. It is in this latter sense that this paper refers to
production efficiency.
6
As noted by Guesnerie [1995: p.192], it is generally difficult to assess the
relationship between social values and market prices (or more generally with
technological conditions prevailing in the economy) in a second-best model with
consumer prices disconnected from producer prices.
 However, Corollary 2.1 shows that
social shadow prices are proportional to producer prices at all second-best optima. This
reinforces the key Diamond-Mirrlees result (but in a dynamic model with bequests which
generate a positive externality) that production efficiency is desirable at second-best
Pareto optima, despite the second-best nature of the model.
7
                                                          
6 In order to minimize notation, the government’s provision of public goods is not explicitly modeled.
7 Recall the Lipsey and Lancaster [1956] general theorem of the second best, which asserts that if a
distortion prevents the attainment of one of the conditions for first-best Pareto optimality, then the other
conditions, although attainable, are generally no longer desirable. The distortion in the present context is19
Corollary 2.2:
At all second-best Pareto optima, the multipliers attached to the bond market
equations (2.8), (2.12), (2.15), and (2.19) are all equal to zero.  That is,  differential
changes in the government’s debt instruments b1, b2, B2, and B3 have no social value.
Corollary 2.2 states that, at all second-best Pareto optima, differential changes in
the government’s debt instruments have no social value. This follows from the fact that
the government has direct control over its bond issues. If changes in its debt instruments
can increase social welfare, then the economy cannot be at an optimum.
Corollary 2.3:
At all second-best Pareto optima, the marginal social benefits of increasing the
taxes 
1
x t , 
2
x t , and 
3
x t  on the first-, second-, and third-period consumption goods are given
by, respectively:
1
1x β −  +  1
21
2 π βσ κ ∇  +  1
32
3 π βσ κ ∇
2
2x β −  +  2
32
3 π βσ κ ∇
3
3x β −
Therefore, given sufficient substitutability between bequests and the consumption goods,
the marginal social benefits of increasing 
1
x t  and 
2
x t  may be positive.
In static models, the marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is
necessarily negative. In the present dynamic model, however, generations 1 and 2 may
                                                                                                                                                                            
the commodity taxes, which prevents marginal rates of substitution in consumption from being equated to
marginal rates of transformation in production.20
substitute bequests for their own consumption, boosting the incomes and welfare of the
recipient generations. For example, consider the first equation in Corollary 2.3. The first
term shows the negative welfare effect of increasing 
1
x t  on generation 1, which operates
through higher first-period consumer prices. The second and third terms show the welfare
effects on generations 2 and 3, which are positive if  1
1
π κ ∇  and  1
2
π κ ∇  are positive. Thus,
it is possible that the marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is positive,
especially in regions of the Pareto frontier in which the implied welfare weight of the
saving (i.e., bequesting) generation is low relative to the recipient’s implied welfare
weight (as governed by the magnitude of βi).
The marginal social benefits of decreasing the taxes on labor income, however,
are always positive as in static models, provided the bequests are normal goods (which is
probably a safe assumption). That is:
Corollary 2.4:
At all second-best Pareto optima, the marginal social benefits of decreasing the
taxes 
1
l t , 
2
l t , and 
3
l t  on first-, second-, and third-period labor income are given by,
respectively:
1
1(1 )  l β −   +  1
21
2 ω βσ κ ∇  +  1
32
3 ω βσ κ ∇
2
2(1 )  l β −   +  2
32
3 ω βσ κ ∇
3
3(1 )  l β − 
Therefore, if the bequests 
1 κ  and 
2 κ  are both normal goods, then the marginal social
benefits of decreasing the taxes on labor income are always positive.21
Consider the first equation in Corollary 2.4. The first term shows the direct
benefit to generation 1 of a decrease in its labor income tax 
1
l t . The second term shows
the benefit to generation 2 if generation 1 spends part of its increase in post-tax labor
income on the bequest 
1 κ . This increases generation 2’s income, so the third term shows
the benefit to generation 3 if part of the increase in generation 2’s income is spent on the
bequest 
2 κ .
Together, Corollaries 2.3 and 2.4 provide some comfort to economists who favor
substituting consumption taxes for income taxes. It should be noted, however, that the
marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is positive only if bequests and
consumption goods are, in fact, substitutes. It is equally likely that, if faced with an
increase in consumer prices, consumers will reduce their bequests in order to maintain
their own levels of consumption.
5. Constraints on the Policy Reform Process
It has thus far been assumed that the government can change all taxes and issue
bonds at will. In reality, however, it is well known that no central authority controls all
taxes, and typically the government must seek legislative approval for changes. This can
potentially hinder the government’s ability to implement reforms. It is also the case that
the government may be unable to implement reforms which reduce the welfare of the
current generation (say by the need to get re-elected), even if such reforms increase the
welfare of future generations, i.e., even if the short-run costs are outweighed by the long-
run benefits. This places a political constraint on the set of reforms. These issues are
addressed in this section.22
5.1. Restrictions on the Government’s Intertemporal Policy Instruments
The taxation of capital has long been a controversial issue, and proposed increases
in capital taxation may be blocked by the legislature for political reasons.
8 Restrictions on
the government’s ability to issue debt, such as period-by-period balanced budget
restrictions, have also been proposed. We explore the consequences of such restrictions
on the policy reform process.
First, suppose the government is not permitted to increase the taxes on savings
(i.e., purchases of the capital good) by generations 1 and 2. That is, we impose the
restrictions 
1 d k t  ≤ 0 and 
2 d k t  ≤ 0. By Motzkin’s Theorem, if there is no solution dP to:
∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) ∇VdP á 0
(3)
(2 1) (4 17)
(2)
(4 6) (2 12)
01 0









That is, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy
reform process (with the restrictions on savings taxation), then there exist vectors λ > 0
(3),
µ ≥ 0
(3n+11), and θ ≥ 0
(2) such that:
λ∇V + 
(2 1) (4 17)










 = µ∇Z          (5.1)
The system (5.1) is the same as the system (4.1) which characterizes unrestricted
second-best optima, except the 4th and 11th equations in (5.1) include the multipliers 〈θ1,
θ2〉 which correspond to the restrictions on capital taxation. Note that if either of the
restrictions are binding, i.e., if there exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto
                                                          
8 Blackorby and Brett [2004] address the question as to whether it is optimal to tax capital.23
improving reform in the absence of the restrictions, then θ  ≠ 0
(2). This leads to the
following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3:
Suppose the government is not permitted to increase the taxes on savings by
generations 1 and 2.  Then production efficiency holds in period 1 (period 2) at all
second-best Pareto optima if and only if the constraint on the taxation of savings in
period 1 (period 2) is not binding. (Note: production efficiency always remains desirable
in period 3.)
In other words, production efficiency is no longer a necessary condition for
second-best optimality if the government cannot increase the taxes on capital. In regions
of the Pareto frontier in which the constraints are not binding, production efficiency
remains desirable. However, when one of the constraints is binding, the marginal social
benefit of increasing the corresponding tax is greater than the marginal social cost. In this
case, the government would like to increase the tax to directly determine bequests and the
supply of capital available to the firm. Instead, it must distort producer prices relative to
social shadow prices as an indirect (and imperfect) means of control. For example, the
government might instruct a public producer to use more than the efficient quantity of
capital in order to (indirectly) increase the price of capital. Roughly speaking, this is the
classic ‘two wrongs make a right’ result of second-best theory.
The second way that the government can influence intertemporal income transfers
is by issuing bonds itself. However, history suggests that government deficits and debt
levels can become excessive, imposing a burden on future generations. In response, some24
economists have argued in favor of various forms of fiscal constraint, the most extreme
of which are balanced budget restrictions. The following result, which is proved in the
Appendix, shows that such restrictions do not disturb production efficiency.
Proposition 4:
Production efficiency remains desirable at all second-best Pareto optima in the
presence of constraints on the government’s debt instruments, including period-by-period
balanced budget restrictions, whether or not the constraints are binding.
From the point of view of production efficiency, then, restrictions on the
government’s ability to issue debt are preferable to restrictions on the government’s
ability to tax private capital. Even though the capital good and government bonds are
perfect substitutes (from the perspective of each generation), purchases and sales of
bonds are transactions between consumers and the government only; they do not involve
the production sector. The producer is affected only indirectly by the prices it receives
and pays for capital.
5.2. Social Welfare and Political Constraints
Until now attention has focused on the possibility of Pareto improving reforms,
i.e., reforms which increase the welfare of every generation. However, the Pareto
criterion can be criticized as being much too demanding, especially if the status quo
equilibrium involves a highly unequal distribution of income. Moreover, in general, the
set of feasible reforms which increase the welfare of every agent in the economy is likely
to be small, if not empty. For these reasons, the government may instead refer to a social
welfare function W(
1 V , 
2 V , 
3 V ). However, the government may have to ensure that a25
reform does not reduce the welfare of some generation, say by the need to get re-elected.
This places a political constraint on the set of social-welfare improving reforms.
First, we show in Proposition 5 that a characterization analogous to that in
Proposition 1 goes through using the social-welfare criterion (excluding for the moment
political constraints). Note that a reform dP increases social welfare if and only if dW =
∇WdP  > 0, where ∇W is the gradient of the social welfare function and is defined
explicitly in the Appendix.
Proposition 5:
If ∇W ∈ Γ, then there does not exist an equilibrium preserving policy reform
process  that increases social welfare.  If  ∇W  ∉  Γ,  then there exists an equilibrium
preserving policy reform process that increases social welfare.
Proof:
By Farkas’ Theorem, there exists a µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z = ∇W, or there
exists a dP such that ∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) and ∇WdP > 0. Next, note that ∇W ∈ Γ implies that
there must exist a µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z = ∇W. Conversely, ∇W ∉ Γ implies that
there cannot exist a µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that µ∇Z = ∇W. Ç
Corollary 5.1:
If ∇W ∈ Γ the economy is at a local second-best optimum and there exists a
vector of multipliers µ ∈ 
3+ 1 1 n
+    such that:
∇W = µ∇Z     (5.2)26
The system of equations (5.2) is identical to the system (4.1). Thus, it makes no
difference whether second-best optima are characterized using the Pareto criterion or the
social-welfare criterion. Intuition for this result is provided in the discussion of
Proposition 6 below.
We can now examine the implications of political constraints on the policy reform
process. Specifically, suppose the welfare of generation i cannot be reduced in the
process of implementing a social-welfare improving reform. By Motzkin’s Theorem, if
there does not exist a policy reform process dP such that:
∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) ∇WdP > 0      ∇V
idP ≥ 0
then there exists     0 γ > , 
(3 +11)    0
n µ ≥ , and     0 θ ≥  such that:
∇W + 
i V θ∇  =  Z µ∇
where   =  θθ γ  and   =  µµ γ . If the political constraint is binding (θ ≠ 0) there exists a
social-welfare improving reform, but all such reforms make generation i worse-off. The
following result can now be stated.
Proposition 6:
Suppose the government is prevented from implementing social-welfare
improving reforms which make generation i worse-off. Then second-best Pareto optima
are still characterized by (4.1), except λi is replaced by λi + θ.
That is, the political constraint simply acts to increase the implied welfare weight
of generation i from λi to λi + θ. The intuition can be explained by reference to Figure 2.
Conditions for second-best optimality hold at all points on the Pareto frontier. The27
political constraint, requiring that the welfare of generation 1 (for example) not be
reduced below its initial level (say 
1 U ), means that the economy is initially at a point on
the Pareto frontier (say E ) which is relatively favorable to generation 1. In the absence of
the political constraint, the government could implement a social-welfare improving
reform and move the economy towards E
*.
Thus, the social-welfare approach and political constraints do not fundamentally
alter the necessary conditions for second-best Pareto optimality obtained in Section 4.
This implies that the results obtained earlier in the paper are robust to this alternative
approach (except that the implied welfare weight of generation i is increased if the
political constraint favoring generation i is binding).
6. Concluding Comments
The existing tax reform literature views tax reform as a dynamic process, but it
uses static models. Examples of this literature include: Guesnerie [1977, 1995], Diewert
[1978], Dixit [1979], Weymark [1979], Brett [1998], and Murty and Russell [2003]. This
paper has examined tax reform in a dynamic version of the Diamond-Mirrlees-Guesnerie
model (which is the classic model used in optimal tax and tax reform) whereby the
periods (or economies) are dynamically linked by bequests, and the government can run
(temporary) budget deficits and surpluses. In this framework, the process of tax reform
cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies. The main contributions of the
paper are:
1.  the development of a simple dynamic model which makes it possible to analyze tax
reform as a dynamic process;28
2.  the development of a tax reform methodology which makes it possible to derive the
conditions under which each generation/agent can and cannot be made better-off (in
addition to the usual Pareto improving conditions);
3.  second-best Pareto optima have been characterized as in the optimal tax literature,
with special attention paid to intertemporal conditions and how these compare to
static optimal tax formulae;
4.  production efficiency is shown to be desirable at all second-best Pareto optima,
reinforcing the key Diamond-Mirrlees result (but in a dynamic model), but not if
there are restrictions on the taxation of private savings. Restrictions on government
savings, however, do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency; and
5.  it makes no difference whether second-best optima are characterized using the Pareto
criterion or the social-welfare criterion, and political constraints which favor some
generation simply increase the implied welfare weight of that generation (without
disturbing fundamentally the conditions for second-best optimality).
Regarding the issue of production efficiency, the paper contributes to a continuing
literature which concludes that the Diamond-Mirrlees result is the exception rather than
the rule. In the context of the issue of fiscal federalism, Blackorby and Brett [2000] show
that production inefficiency is a characteristic of almost all (second-best) Pareto optima
when the states control some taxes and the federal government controls others. Similarly,
in an international setting, Keen and Wildasin [2004] show that when each country faces
its own government’s budget constraint the Diamond-Mirrlees result no longer applies. In
the dynamic model of the present paper, where the government can effect intertemporal29
transfers by influencing the savings behavior of the private sector and by issuing bonds
itself, we show that (effective) restrictions on the taxation of private savings entail
production inefficiency at second-best Pareto optima. However, restrictions on
government savings do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency.
Finally, it has been suggested that dynamic tax reform could be studied in a model
in which agents live for more than one period and save for life cycle reasons. While this
is certainly feasible, it would slightly complicate the model and simply change the motive
for saving (from an altruistic bequest motive to saving for their own future consumption).
Moreover, the fundamental issues addressed in this paper would remain the same, i.e., the
process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies as a reform in
one period will affect savings and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in
subsequent periods.30
FIGURE 1
The Geometry of Proposition 1 and its Corollaries
E.g. 1: There exists an equilibrium preserving reform that makes generation 1
better-off (shaded area), but generations 2 and 3 are made worse-off.
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Let A be an a×n matrix and let b be an n-dimensional vector. Then either
Ax ≤ 0
(a) bx > 0
has a solution x, where x is an n-dimensional vector, or
λA = b
has a solution λ ≥ 0
(a), where λ is an a-dimensional vector, but never both.
Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative.
Let A, B, and C be a×n, b×n, and c×n matrices. Then either
Ax á 0
(a) Bx ≥ 0
(b) Cx = 0
(c)
has a solution x, where x is an n-dimensional vector, or
λ1A + λ2B + λ3C = 0
(n) λ1 > 0
(a), λ2 ≥ 0
(b), λ3 unrestricted
has a solution λ1, λ2, and λ3, where λ1, λ2, and λ3 are a-dimensional, b-dimensional, and
c-dimensional vectors, but never both.
Further details on the above theorems can be found in Mangasarian [1969].
(II) Proof of Corollary 2.1.
Subtracting the first equation in (4.1) from the second yields:
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ 〉 1 1 p x ∇  +  1 n+ µ 1 1 p k ∇  −  3 n+ µ 1 1 p L ∇  = 0
(n)         (A.1)
Subtracting the third equation in (4.1) from the fourth yields:
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ 〉 1 1 r x ∇  +  1 n+ µ 1 1 r k ∇  −  3 n+ µ 1 1 r L ∇  = 0        (A.2)
Subtracting the fifth equation in (4.1) from the sixth yields:33
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ 〉 1 1 w x ∇  +  1 n+ µ 1 1 w k ∇  −  3 n+ µ 1 1 w L ∇  = 0        (A.3)
Combining (A.1) − (A.3) yields:
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ ,  1 n+ µ ,  3 n+ µ 〉 1 1 ˆ ˆ
p x ∇  = 0
(n+2)      (A.4)
where  1 ˆ x  combines the supply of  1 x ,  1 k , and  1 L , and 















1) in producer prices that:
1 1 ˆ ˆ
p x ∇〈
1
1 p , ..., 
1
n p , 
1 r , 
1 w 〉 = 0
(n+2)      (A.5)




1) that 〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ ,  1 n+ µ ,  3 n+ µ 〉 = η〈
1
1 p , ..., 
1
n p , 
1 r , 
1 w 〉 for some scalar η > 0.
That is, first-period social shadow prices are proportional to first-period producer prices.
In a similar manner, it can be shown that second- and third-period social shadow prices
are proportional to second- and third-period producer prices. Ç
(III) Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is analogous to that of Corollary 2.1, except subtracting the third
equation in (5.1) from the fourth yields:
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ 〉 1 1 r x ∇  +  1 n+ µ 1 1 r k ∇  −  3 n+ µ 1 1 r L ∇  = θ1        (A.2’)
The expression corresponding to (A.4) becomes:
〈 1 µ , ...,  n µ ,  1 n+ µ ,  3 n+ µ 〉 1 1 ˆ ˆ
p x ∇  = 〈0
(n), θ1, 0〉      (A.4’)34
From (A.4’) and (A.5) it follows that first-period social shadow prices are proportional to
first-period producer prices if and only if θ1 = 0, i.e., if and only if the constraint
preventing increases in first-period savings taxation is not binding. In a similar manner, it
can be shown that production efficiency holds in the second period if and only if θ2 = 0,
i.e., if and only if the constraint preventing increases in second-period savings taxation is
not binding. Ç
(IV) Proof of Proposition 4.
Requiring that the government balance its budget period-by-period requires that
the following restrictions be placed on its bond issues: db1 + b1 = 0, db2 + b2 = 0, dB2 +
B2 = 0, and dB3 + B3 = 0. There exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving
reform with the government’s budget balanced period-by-period if and only if there exists
a solution dP to the following non-homogenous system:
∇ZdP ≤ 0
(3n+11) ∇VdP á 0
(3)      
(2 4) (4 14)
1
(4 11) (2 7)
2























  −  
  −
   −  
   (A.6)
The non-homogenous system (A.6) has a solution dP if and only if the following
homogeneous system (A.7) has a solution 〈dP, D〉, where D is a dummy variable used to
convert the non-homogenous system (A.6) into the homogeneous system (A.7).
()
(3 11) (3 +11) d
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    

       (A.7)
By Motzkin’s Theorem, if there is no solution 〈dP, D〉 to (A.7), then there exist
vectors 〈λ, ξ〉 > 0
(4), µ ≥ 0
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 =  ()
(3 11) 0
n Z µ
+ ∇    (A.8)
The only differences between (A.8) and the unrestricted conditions for second-best
optimality contained in (4.1) are that θ1, θ2, θ3, and θ4 are added, respectively, to the 7th,
16th, 17th, and 24th equations in (4.1), and an additional condition:
ξ + θ1b1 + θ2b2 + θ3B2 + θ4B3 = 0
is introduced. However, none of these changes affect the equations required to prove
production efficiency (see the proof of Corollary 2.1). Therefore, restrictions on the
government’s debt instruments do not affect the desirability of production efficiency. Ç
(V) Defining the Matrices and Vectors.
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The gradients of the consumers’ indirect utility functions (with respect to dP) are
given by:
∇V
1 := 〈 1
1 V
π ∇ ,  1
1 V
π ∇ ,  1
1 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
1 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
1 V
ω ∇ ,  1
1 V





2 := 〈 1
2 V
π ∇ ,  1
2 V
π ∇ ,  1
2 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
2 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
2 V
ω ∇ ,  1
2 V
ω ∇ , 0,  2
2 V
π ∇ ,  2
2 V





ρ ∇ ,  2
2 V
ω ∇ ,  2
2 V
ω ∇ ,  2
2 V
σ ∇ ,  2
2 V





3 := 〈 1
3 V
π ∇ ,  1
3 V
π ∇ ,  1
3 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
3 V
ρ ∇ ,  1
3 V
ω ∇ ,  1
3 V
ω ∇ , 0,  2
3 V
π ∇ ,  2
3 V





ρ ∇ ,  2
3 V
ω ∇ ,  2
3 V
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3 V
σ ∇ ,  2
3 V
σ ∇ , 0
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3 V
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3 V
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σ ∇ , 0, 
3
RV ∇〉
 The gradient of the social welfare function (with respect to dP) is given by:
∇W := 〈 1
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1 V
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is the welfare weight of generation i.39
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